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INTRODUCTION

West Virginia case law allows a wrongfully and maliciously
discharged employee to secure a massive damage award. For example, one
plaintiff recently received a front pay award of $1,992,332 after he filed a
wrongful discharge suit when his job was eliminated after his employer was
acquired by a larger company.' The reason this individual was able to receive
such a large front pay award is that, in West Virginia, a wrongfully and
maliciously discharged employee is entitled to compensation calculated from
the time of discharge until retirement age. In this case, the plaintiff was fortyseven years old when his position was eliminated; his front pay award
represents what he would have earned in wages from the time his job was
eliminated until he would have retired at age sixty-seven. This damages rule is
the result of thirty years of jurisprudence rooted in Mason County Board of
Education v. State Superintendent of Schools,2 a 1982 case in which the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals ("WVSCA") transplanted this de facto
"collateral source rule" into the labor and employment relationship.
The collateral source rule is grounded in tort law and traditionally was
applied only in tri-party situations involving accidents. The parties involved in
such accidents were the injured party, the wrongdoer, and an insurance agency.
The collateral source rule is a damages rule used to determine the amount of
compensation the defendant will receive. The rule states that the defendant
must pay the total amount he is deemed to owe the plaintiff even if the plaintiff
has already recovered part of that amount from a third party, such as an
insurance agency. For example, when the injured party is to be compensated a
total of $100,000 and the insurance agency-either the injured party's or the
wrongdoer's insurance agency-pays $60,000, should the wrongdoer then only
be responsible for the remaining $40,000? In other words, could the damages
I

Rice v. Burke-Parsons-Bowlby Corp., No. 09-C-41, at 2 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. June 9, 2010),
http://www.courtswv.gov/supreme-court/calendar/2012/briefs/septl2/1 1available
at
0183order.pdf.
2
Mason Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. State Superintendent of Sch. (Mason County Ill), 295 S.E.2d
719 (W. Va. 1982).
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the wrongdoer pays be mitigated by the insurance company's payments? The
collateral source rule would say "no": the wrongdoer must pay the full
$100,000 in addition to any compensation the insurance agency-the collateral
source-provides.
In Mason County, the WVSCA held that discharged employees are
required to mitigate damages by making reasonable efforts to find comparable
employment. An employee is incentivized to find new employment because if
the employer can prove there was comparable employment available in the
local area and the plaintiff did not take reasonable efforts to find and accept that
employment, the court will deduct from his back pay award the wages the
employee could have earned at that job. However, in Mason County, the
WVSCA carved an exception to this rule: an employer who wrongfully and
maliciously discharges an employee is estopped from raising the employee's
duty to mitigate at trial, and the employee is instead entitled to receive a flat
back pay award. Applying the collateral source rule to an employment scenario,
the employee is the injured party, the employer is the wrongdoer, and the new
employer is the collateral source. This is the malicious discharge exception,
otherwise known as the Mason County rule.
It was not until 2009 that this rule allowed such large monetary
recovery. Whereas the Mason County rule originally applied only to back pay,
the WVSCA extended the rule to front pay in Peters v. Rivers Edge Mining,
Inc. Front pay awards are traditionally calculated to cut off at the time the
employee finds comparable employment or should have found comparable
employment had he taken reasonable efforts to do so. But the Mason County
malicious discharge exception removes this cut-off point, thereby allowing an
employee to receive several decades worth of unearned wages.
The Mason County rule, as extended to front pay in Peters, is the
collateral source rule applied to a labor and employment context. This
application is unique, first, because the collateral source rule historically
applied to tort cases involving automobile accidents or medical malpractice
and, second, because the majority rule is that discharged employees are
required to mitigate damages by seeking new employment. The rule's
application to the labor and employment context is particularly interesting
considering that the rule was transposed at a time when both the collateral
source rule and at-will employment were controversial. In the 1980s, legal
scholars criticized the collateral source rule as part of their call for tort reform,
and simultaneously legal scholars were calling for reformation of at-will
employment. Yet in the midst of this controversy, the WVSCA created the
Mason County rule: an employer who maliciously discharges an employee is
estopped from raising the affirmative defense of the mitigation of damages.
Conversely, since 1982, the collateral source rule has been severely limited or
even abolished by many states' legislatures. But the Mason County rule,

3

Peters v. Rivers Edge Mining, Inc., 680 S.E.2d 791 (W. Va. 2009).
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ensconced in the labor employment context, remains insulated from the
limitations that the West Virginia legislature has placed on the rule in other
areas of law.4
This Note argues that the Mason County rule is the collateral source
rule applied to a labor and employment relationship, that the rule's strong
presence in the labor and employment context contradicts its steady decline in
other areas of law, and that the Mason County rule is detrimental to West
Virginia's business climate and should be overruled and replaced with the
majority rule. By extending the Mason County collateral source rule to front
pay in Peters, the court allows plaintiff-employees to recover damages for the
remainder of their working lives. These multi-decade damage awards both hurt
business economics in West Virginia and remove incentives for employees to
seek new employment. Furthermore, employees and employers are denied
predictability and certainty with this rule because the court has not clearly
defined what constitutes a "malicious discharge."
Part II provides the collateral source rule's legal background. Part III
explains the employment relationship including the history of at-will
employment, the public policy tort, remedies, and forms of employment other
than at-will employment. Part IV then shows how the WVSCA grafted the
collateral source rule into its labor and employment jurisprudence and has since
extended the rule to award large damages. Part V summarizes the Mason
County rule, collateral source rule, and the wrongful discharge cases.
Finally, Part VI provides recommendations. The author first provides
an original recommendation, which is that the court should overrule the Mason
County malicious discharge exception that acts as the collateral source rule in
labor and employment relationships. Then the author summarizes four other
recommendations that have been either used by legislatures or suggested by
legal scholars and practitioners to prevent the collateral source rule from
allowing excessive jury awards. These solutions are to apply due process
restraints to the award, create a statutory arbitration model to reform
employment law, enact a damages limitation statute, or enact a statutory
scheme such as Montana's Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act. While
each of these latter solutions would provide certainty and predictability for all
parties that the current law does not provide, overruling the Mason County rule
is optimal because it efficiently balances the policy considerations relevant to
both plaintiff-employee and defendant-employer while not discouraging a
positive business environment.
The Mason County rule, which is the collateral source rule applied in a
labor and employment context, applies to a very narrow cause of action. For the
Mason County rule to apply, the employee must file a public policy tort against
his employer, and the court must then find that the employer not only
wrongfully discharged the employee but also discharged the employee with

4

See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-9a (LexisNexis 2008).
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malice. To fully understand how and when an employee can use a public policy
tort cause of action, it is necessary to understand how the public policy tort
came to exist as a cause of action. First, however, it is necessary to understand
the collateral source rule and its place in American jurisprudence.
II. THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE
The collateral source rule has existed in American jurisprudence for
over 150 years. During that time, legislatures have severely limited or even
abolished the rule because it allows excessive damage awards. This Part
provides the background of the collateral source rule and details about how
legislatures have narrowed the rule, which is important for understanding why
it is significant that this rule has remained unchanged while tucked away in
West Virginia's labor and employment jurisprudence.
A.

Background of the CollateralSource Rule

The collateral source rule requires a wrongdoer to pay the victim the
full cost of the injury he caused, even if the victim already received
compensation from an independent-a "collateral"-source.f The collateral
source rule is uniquely American and first appeared in American jurisprudence
in 1854.6 This rule traditionally applied to common law tort insurance cases.
For example, where one ship recklessly or negligently collides with a second
ship and the second ship is covered by insurance, the damages owed by the first
ship's owner will not be reduced by the payments the owner of the second ship
receives from the collateral source. The insurance company is the collateral
source. Thus, the second ship's owner will receive full compensation from the
first ship's owner in addition to any payments received from the insurance
company, which is essentially a double recovery or a windfall for the plaintiff.
But if the wrongdoer-the second ship's owner-is relieved from paying
damages or part of the damages due because of the collateral source's
payments, then the wrongdoer would get a windfall. The question of who gets
the windfall is one reason the collateral source rule is so controversial.'

John G. Fleming, The CollateralSource and ContractDamages, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 56, 57
(1983). John G. Fleming was a Professor of Law at the University of California at Berkley.
6
The Propeller Monticello v. Mollison, 58 U.S. 152 (1854).
Id. at 155 ("The insurer does not stand in the relation of a joint trespasser, so that
satisfaction accepted from him shall be a release of others.").
8
Fleming, supra note 5, at 85. However, Professor Fleming argues that this dichotomy is
"oversimplistic." Id. at 86. He correctly states that this "problem is three-, not two-dimensional."
Id. The collateral source rule provides an opportunity for the insurer (the collateral source) to be
reimbursed, and thus it is often the collateral source that "contests the defendant's plea for
mitigation." Id. However, this Note focuses on the relationship between the two parties and does
not analyze indemnification from a collateral source.
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Justifications for the collateral source rule in its traditional application
include maximizing the possibility that the insurer will be indemnified, 9
providing "the plaintiff with a measure of redemption by punishing the
defendant," 0 and providing the plaintiff with adequate compensation." While
the rule may serve proper and reasonable purposes in many situations, there are
narrow circumstances in which the collateral source rule's justifications are not
relevant. This Note addresses one such instance: when a maliciously and
wrongfully discharged plaintiff is no longer required to mitigate either back or
front pay damages by reasonably seeking comparable employment, and the rule
allows him to recover damages for the remainder of his life-or at least until
retirement age. It makes no difference whether the plaintiff is twenty-five years
old or sixty years old; the defendant will be required to pay the plaintiff wages
as if he had worked until retirement age, in addition to an unmitigated back pay
award, emotional distress damages, and punitive damages.12 In these
circumstances, the "sting" of the collateral source rule is strong: by not being
required to reasonably seek comparable employment, the plaintiff may keep
ordinary damages and the collateral benefit and "thus turn his plight into a
bonanza." 3 These excessive damage awards are one of the reasons that other
legislatures have limited the collateral source rule in the context to which it
traditionally applies.
B.

Narrowingof the CollateralSource Rule

The potential for a plaintiffs award to turn into a "bonanza" is one
reason the rule is still "one of the most troublesome in the modem law of
damages."l 4 Scholars targeted this rule in their tort reform efforts, and many

9
James Ulciny, Note, Corl v. Huron Castings, Inc.: Wrongful Dischargeand the Collateral
Source Rule, 1997 DETROIT C.L. REv. 273, 275 (1997) (citing Fleming, supra note 5, at 77-79).
Oftentimes, insurance companies can be indemnified or reimbursed after the primary source has
made full payment. Id at 275.
10
Id. (citing Fleming, supra note 5, at 58).
1
Id (citing James L. Branton, The CollateralSource Rule, 18 ST. MARY's L.J. 883, 885
(1987)).
12 In a recent case in West Virginia, a forty-seven-year-old plaintiff was awarded twenty
years of unmitigated front pay based on the assumption that he would have retired at age sixtyseven; the front pay award was $1,991,332. Rice v. Burke-Parsons-Bowlby Corp., No. 09-C-41,
at 2 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. June 9, 2010), available at http://www.courtswv.gov/supremecourt/calendar/2012/briefs/septl2/11-0183order.pdf.
13 John G. Fleming, The CollateralSource Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 54 CALIF.
L. REv. 1478, 1478 (1966). Professor Fleming states that this "problem is a by-product of the
affluent society." Id. In the "olden days," there was rarely any outside source such as an accident
policy or life insurance with which to provide a remedy. Id.
14 Fleming, supra note 5, at 56.
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state legislatures restricted the rule's usage.15 At least eighteen states abolished
or limited the rule for medical malpractice cases,16 and one state abolished the
rule in products liability cases.17 Two states abolished the rule in torts cases in
which the government is the defendant,18 Minnesota abolished or restricted the
rule in automobile cases,19 some states have entirely abolished the rule, 20 and
others have abolished it in regard to sources that are "public collateral
sources."21 Even where legislatures have not yet abolished the rule, some have
attempted to reform the rule. In Alaska, the rule has been so restricted that the
plaintiff bears the burden of proof to show that it was actually he who initially
paid for those collateral benefits.22 Illinois' legislature enacted a "collateral
threshold" of $25,000, "after which there is a fifty percent reduction in
recoverable damages that represent benefits received from a collateral
source." 23
West Virginia's legislature also limited the collateral source rule. In
2003, it enacted West Virginia Code Section 55-7B-9a, which allows
compensatory damages for economic losses to be reduced by payments from
collateral sources for the same injury in a medical professional liability
action.24 Specifically, a defendant who has been found liable to a plaintiff for
damages for "medical care, rehabilitation services, lost earnings or other
economic losses" may now provide "evidence of payments the plaintiff has
received for the same injury from collateral sources" 25 or will receive in the
future from a collateral source for the same injury. 26
Given that there has been such a strong movement among
legislatures-including West Virginia's legislature-to reform or abolish the
collateral source rule, it is inconsistent that the West Virginia courts have
applied the rule to labor and employment relationships since 1982 and have

1s
Branton, supra note 11, at 887. Some statutes limiting or abolishing the rule have been
challenged. Id. at 888. They are typically challenged on equal protection or due process grounds.
Id.
16
See id. at 887 n.23.
17 Id. at 887-88 (citing ALA. CODE § 6-6-522 (1975)).
18
Branton, supra note 11, at 888. Those two states are New Jersey and Pennsylvania. Id.; see
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:9-2 (West 1982); 42 PA. STAT. ANN. § 8663(d) (West 1982). Id. at n.25.
19 Branton, supra note 11, at 888; see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 65B.51 (West 2012).
20
Branton, supra note 11, at 888; see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-111.6 (West
2012).
21 Branton, supra note 11, at 888; see DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 18, § 6862 (2012).
22
Branton, supra note 11, at 889.

23

Id. at 889.

24

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-9a (LexisNexis 2008).
Id. § 55-7B-9a(a).
Id. § 55-7B-9a(b).

25
26
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extended the rule as recently as 2009. The collateral source rule may have been
grafted into labor and employment jurisprudence in response to the controversy
over at-will employment in the 1980s. To further realize why this may be the
case, an explanation of the controversy surrounding at-will employment is
discussed next.
III. THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP

To understand why it is significant that the collateral source rule has
been applied to labor and employment relationships, it is first necessary to
understand the law surrounding those relationships-particularly how the law
is used when those relationships end-because the Mason County rule applies
to the public policy tort action. The public policy tort action is an exception to
at-will employment. Therefore, to fully understand Mason County, the starting
point is America's default employment rule: at-will employment.
At-Will Employment 7

A.

At-will employment is the premise of the American employment
relationship.28 This rule states that an employer and an employee create a
relationship that either party may end at any time for any reason. 29 Neither
party owes the other party damages for severing that relationship.30 At-will
employment, like the collateral source rule, is uniquely American3' and arose in
27
For a strong defense of at-will employment, see Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the
Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 947 (1984).
28
See Clyde W. Summers, Employment At Will in the United States: The Divine Right of
Employers, 3 U. PA. J.LAB. & EMP. L. 65 (2001).
29
Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 516 (1884), overruled in part by Hutton v. Watters,
179 S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915).
30

Id

3
American employment law was rooted in English common law, which presumed an
employment relationship to be a one-year hiring unless the parties explicitly stated otherwise.
Summers, supra note 28, at 66; see also 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *413. This

presumption could be rebutted by showing that the parties' intent or industry customs indicated
otherwise. Summers, supra note 28, at 66. However, American employment law did not adopt
the annual hiring presumption and instead ascertained the parties' intent through the "facts and
circumstances of each case . . . with the most critical fact being the period of payment." Id. at 6667. But American courts were divided over what facts defined the terms of the employment
relationship: some courts found the pay period-weekly, monthly, or annually-to be
determinable, and other courts instead looked at the facts surrounding the contract. Id. at 67.
American employment law was "confused"; courts were "going in diverse directions." Id. Horace
Wood, an American treatise writer, sought to "resolve the contradictions in American law." Id. In
1877, Wood explained what is now the rule of at-will employment:
With us, the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring isprimafacie
a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the
burden is on him to establish it by proof. A hiring at so much a day, week,
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the late nineteenth century when "natural law concepts of property and freedom
of contract, laissez faire economics, and [the] great industrial expansion"
dominated the legal and cultural landscape.3 2 By 1930, the rule was firmly
embedded in American law.33 West Virginia adopted the at-will employment
rule in 1913" and has consistently upheld the rule to present day.
However, there are exceptions to the at-will employment relationship.
These exceptions developed in the mid-1900s when at-will employment was
limited by common law and statutory laws such as the labor-management
statutes produced by the New Deal Era, federal and state fair employment laws
of the 1960s, and other federal and state statutes governing the employment
relationship. 3 6 In the 1980s, a number of legal academics called for at-will
employment to either be reformed or done away with altogether.37 Despite
being severely tailored, at-will employment is still the default American
employment rule. Thus, to understand the significance of the collateral source
rule's application to an employment relationship, it is necessary to explain how
labor and employment law transformed from a damages-free, at-will
employment rule to allow tort-action remedies.
At-will employment has been reshaped by three common law
doctrines: implied in fact contract theory, implied covenant theory, and

month or year, no time being specified, is an indefinite hiring, and no
presumption attaches that it was for a day even, but only at the rate fixed for
whatever time the party may serve.
H. G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134 (1877); see also
Summers, supra note 28, at 67.
32
See Robert M. Bastress, A Synthesis and a Proposalfor Reform of the Employment At-Will
Doctrine,90 W. VA. L. REV. 319, 342 (1988).
33
Summers, supra note 28, at 68.
34
Resener v. Watts, 80 S.E. 839, 840 (W. Va. 1914). In Resener, the employee who worked
as a salesman quit his job and demanded that he be given the amount of sales commissions be
had earned thus far and would have otherwise been given to him at the end of the work year. Id.
at 839. The employee argued that he was an at-will employee and should be given the sales
commission he had eamed up to the point of quitting. Id. The WVSCA agreed with him and
simultaneously adopted the at-will employment rule. Id. at 840-41.
3
Swears v. R.M. Roach & Sons, Inc., 696 S.E.2d 1, 5 (W. Va. 2010) (quoting Syl. pt. 2,
Wright v. Standard Ultramarine & Color Co., 90 S.E.2d 459 (W. Va. 1955)) (explaining that it is
a long-established rule that "[w]hen a contract of employment is of indefinite duration it may be
terminated at any time by either party to the contract"); see also id. at 5-6 (quoting Feliciano v.
7-Eleven, Inc., 559 S.E.2d 713, 718 (W. Va. 2001)) (concluding that "an at-will employee serves
the will and pleasure of his or her employer and can be discharged at any time, with or without
cause").
36
Bastress, supra note 32, at 321-24.
3
See id.; Summers, supranote 28.
38
See 1 HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE 4 (4th ed. 1998).
The implied in fact theory breaks the at-will presumption by forming an implied contract
between the employer and employee. One of the most popular arguments under this theory is the
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public policy tort theory. 40 This Note focuses on the public policy tort theory
and its implications in West Virginia, particularly how the collateral source rule
was grafted into its jurisprudence.
Exception to At- Will Employment: The Public Policy Tort Theory

B.

The public policy tort theory is also referred to as "retaliatory
discharge" and "wrongful discharge' ' and is the "most widely-adopted
common law exception to the at-will doctrine."42 This doctrine allows an
employee to sue in tort theory if her dismissal violates public policy. 4 3
Professor Charles McCormick was the first to suggest that arbitrary
discharge-even from at-will employment-be treated as a tort for which a
plaintiff can recover emotional and punitive damages.44 McCormick stated that
this cause of action would be created through "a hybrid tort-contract basis of
liability" that would be triggered if an employee-even an at-will employeewas discharged for "false charges or from inadequate reason."45 In addition to
these three wrongful dismissal doctrines, more than twenty federal statutes and
46
even more state statutes now provide legal redress for wrongful termination.
To recover under the public policy tort theory, the plaintiff must prove
(1) "[t]he existence of a clear public policy manifested in a state or federal

"handbook rule," which West Virginia adopted in 1986 in Cook v. Heck's Inc., 342 S.E.2d 453,
459 (W. Va. 1986). If an employer promises via an employee handbook to not discharge
employees except for specific reasons, then that handbook "may form the basis of a unilateral
contract." Id. The employer is bound to abide by the rules of conduct, discipline procedures, and
benefits delineated in the handbook. Summers, supra note 28, at 71. Handbooks are now
considered to be part of the employment contract even if the parties did not sign a contract upon
hiring. See id. at 71. For a thorough analysis of how Cook contributed to the erosion of the at-will
employment doctrine in West Virginia, see Francesca Tan, Comment, Cook v. Heck's: Erosion
ofEmployment At Will in West Virginia, 89 W. VA. L. REv. 379 (1987).
39
See PERRITr, supra note 38, at 5. The implied covenant theory holds every employment
relationship-including at-will employment-is a contract and that the parties are required to act
with good faith and fair dealing. Bastress, supra note 32, at 337. However, most states, including
West Virginia, do not recognize this doctrine. PERRITr, supra note 38, at 7-8; see also Shell v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 396 S.E.2d 174, 181 (W. Va. 1990) (declining to adopt implied
covenant theory; facts showed no breach of "substantial public policy").
40
See PERRIT, supra note 38, at 4.
41
Bastress, supra note 32, at 326.
42

Id.

43

Summers, supra note 28, at 70.

John Marks, Symmetrical Use of Universal Damages Principles-Such as the Principles
Underlying the Doctrine of Proximate Cause-to Distinguish Breach-Induced Benefits That
Offset Liabilityfrom Those That Do Not, 55 WAYNEL. REv. 1387, 1432 (2009).
44

45

Id. (quoting CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES

§ 163,

at 638

(1935)).
4

PERRITr, supra note 38, at 3.
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constitution, statute, or administrative regulation, or common law"; (2) that the
employee's dismissal would "jeopardize" that public policy; (3) that the
dismissal was "motivated by conduct related to the public policy"; and (4) that
the employer "lacked overriding legitimate business justification for the
dismissal.'A The question becomes how to determine what public policies are
appropriate to limit employer discretion in discharging employees.4 West
Virginia has a broad standard: its sources of public policy are the federal and
state constitutions, public statutes, judicial decisions, the common law, and the
"acknowledged prevailing concepts of the federal and state government relating
to and affecting the safety, health, morals and general welfare of the people."A9
C.

The Remedies for Wrongful Discharge

Because the collateral source rule is an exception to traditional labor
and employment remedy doctrines, it is necessary to understand the rules that
govern employees' remedies in a public policy tort action. The preferred
remedy is reinstatement, and the employee can typically recover compensatory
damages in addition to reinstatement. If the court finds that reinstatement is not
appropriate, the plaintiff can then recover front pay in lieu of reinstatement. In
a public policy tort action, a plaintiff can recover emotional distress damages
and punitive damages as well.
1.

Reinstatement

The "fundamental principle" of remedies is to place the injured party as
close as possible to the same position as he was in before he was injured.5 o In

Id. at 4.
See Bastress, supra note 32, at 331. Professor Bastress states that, "[i]n its narrowest form,
public policy must be derived from clear and specific legislation designed to protect employees
in their jobs" and that an employee must show that the employer's "actions contravened some
specific provision of that legislation." Id. Courts have little authority to identify public policy
under this standard. Id. But courts have more expansive authority under the following steps: (1)
finding public policy in "general concerns regarding public health, safety, welfare, morals, etc.";
(2) finding public policies in "broadly stated legislative goals"; and (3) expanding the "sources
for identifying public policies beyond those stated in legislation to include administrative
regulations and executive rules, codes of ethics of professional organizations, constitutional
provisions, and judicial decisions." Id.
49
Cordle v. Gen. Hugh Mercer Corp., 325 S.E.2d 111, 325 (W. Va. 1984) (quoting Allen v.
Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 37 A.2d 37, 38-39 (N.J. 1944)); see also Bastress, supra note 32, at
333.
so
DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 15 (3d ed. 2002); Marks, supra note
44, at 1394; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 cmt. a (1981) ("Contract
damages are ordinarily based on the injured party's expectation interest and are intended to give
him the benefit of his bargain by awarding him the sum of money that will, to the extent possible,
put him in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been performed.");
47

48
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other words, the plaintiff should be returned to his "rightful position."51 In a
wrongful discharge case, a plaintiff employee is returned to his rightful position
through reinstatement to his job; this is an equitable remedy that is used at the
court's discretion.52 Reinstatement historically was not recognized as a remedy
for a retaliatory discharge tort action; legal damages were the preferred remedy
for this exception to at-will employment. But because "no other remedy can
fully compensate an employee for the wrongful loss of his or her job,"54
reinstatement is now the "standard remedy for employees discharged in
violation of the labor laws, civil service laws, employment discrimination laws,
Some employers
constitutions, and collective bargaining agreements."
argue-and some cases have held-that "reinstatement should be the preferred
or exclusive remedy, because juries award excessive damages."56 In such cases,
whether an employee is reinstated or not, he can still recover some amount of
compensatory damages.
2.

Compensatory Damages

Both back pay and front pay are compensatory damages intended "to
make a plaintiff as well off as he would have been if he never had been
wronged."57 In West Virginia, compensatory damages include back and front
pay,58 and a plaintiff may also recover emotional distress damages as part of
compensatory damages in a retaliatory discharge case.59
The purpose of back pay is to compensate the employee for the losses
incurred from the date of wrongful dismissal and through the date of
judgment. 60 Back pay includes salary or wages and fringe benefits such as
health insurance, holiday pay, accrued vacation days, pensions and profitsharing contributions, and childcare.6 1

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§

901 cmt. a (1979) ("The law of torts attempts primarily to

put an injured person in a position as nearly as possible equivalent to his position prior to the
tort.").
51
52

LAYCOCK, supra note 50, at 16.

Peters v. Rivers Edge Mining, Inc., 680 S.E.2d 791, 812 (W. Va. 2009).
53 Id. at 811.

54

Id. (quoting 82 AM. JuR. 2D Wrongful Discharge § 230 (2003)).

5
56

Id.

5

See id at 3.

58

Id.

59

Harless v. First Nat'1 Bank in Fairmont, 289 S.E.2d 692, 702 (W. Va. 1982).

60

2 HENRY H. PERRITr, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE 363 (4th ed. 1998).

61

Id.

LAYCOCK, supra note 50, at 440.
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Front pay is defined as the "pay for the period after judgment and
before reinstatement." 6 2 These are "damages for loss of future earnings that he
would have received had he remained with the company."63 However,
calculating front pay "require[s] some degree of speculation as to how long the
employee would have continued working for the employer."6 Courts have held
that front pay can be awarded "in lieu of reinstatement"65 when the employer
and employee have a "hostile relationship"66 or the "employer objects to
reinstatement." 67
3.

Punitive Damages

A plaintiff employee in a public policy tort action can receive punitive
damages. 6 8 The purpose of punitive damages is to punish the wrongdoer.6 9 Tort
law, the only body of law that allows punitive damages, evaluates the "moral
aspect of the defendant's conduct-the moral guilt or blame to be attached in
the eyes of society to the defendant's acts, motives, and state of mind."70 In a
tort action, the "tortfeasor is always blameworthy," but in a breach of contract
action, the court determines which party is in breach not to "punish or
stigmatize that person," but rather to see whether the non-breaching party
should receive a remedy. 7' Thus, as opposed to breach-of-contract remedies,
tort remedies are tailored to simultaneously compensate the injured party and
punish the wrongdoer.72

62
63
6
65

LAYCOCK, supra note 50, at 1118.
PERRITT, supra note 60, at 365.

Id.
LAYCOCK, supra note 50, at 1118.

The WVSCA held that
[a]n employee who asserts a claim alleging workers' compensation
discrimination in accordance with W. VA. CODE § 23-5A-1, et seq., may
recover damages for front pay in lieu of reinstatement. Whether the facts of a
particular case warrant an award of front pay in lieu of reinstatement is a
decision committed to the circuit court, and such determination will be
reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Syl. pt. 11, Peters v. Rivers Edge Mining, Inc., 680 S.E.2d 791 (W. Va. 2009).
66
Peters, 680 S.E.2d at 812; see also Thompson v. Town of Alderson, 600 S.E.2d 290, 293
(W. Va. 2004) (holding that a court may rule preliminarily that it will not consider reinstatement
as a remedy); Dobson v. E. Associated Coal Corp., 422 S.E.2d 494, 501 (W. Va. 1992)
(recognizing front pay as a substitute for reinstatement).
67
Peters, 680 S.E.2d at 813.
68
PERRITT, supra note 60, at 366.
69
See LAYCOCK, supra note 50, at 5.
7o
Ulciny, supra note 9, at 293 n.208 (quoting Corl v. Huron Castings, 544 N.W.2d 278, 281
n.14 (Mich. 1996)).
71
See Ulciny, supra note 9, at 292.
72
Id
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Mitigation of Damages

Both contract and tort legal theories require the plaintiff to mitigate his
damages. Whether the plaintiff is suing under a contract' or tort theory, 74 he is
still required to mitigate his damages by using reasonable efforts to seek
comparable employment. 5 This doctrine is an affirmative defense with the
burden of proof resting on the defendant.7 6 The Supreme Court of the United
States summarized the rule in 1982 in Ford Motor Co. v. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission:"
This duty, rooted in an ancient principle of law, requires the
claimant to use reasonable diligence in finding other suitable
employment. Although the unemployed or underemployed
claimant need not go into another line of work, accept a
demotion, or take a demeaning position, he forfeits his right to
backpay if he refuses a job substantially equivalent to the one
he was denied.
Therefore, an employee should use reasonable efforts to find similar
employment. 7 9 His damages award will be reduced by the wages he has earned
in his new employment.8 If he chooses not to seek new employment, then his
damages will be reduced by what he could have received if similar employment
73

LAYCOCK, supra note 50, at 96. This is the doctrine of avoidable consequences. Id.
74
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1979). Under the offsetting of benefits rule, any
benefit that the plaintiff did or could receive may offset the plaintiffs recoverable damages. Id.
The collateral source rule is an exception to the offsetting of benefits rule. LAYCOCK, supra note
50, at 107; see also Fleming, supra note 13, at 1478 (describing the collateral source rule as
"[high ranking] among the oddities of American accident law" and providing an international
comparative analysis). This rule operates as "both a rule of evidence and a rule of damages."
Branton, supra note 11, at 883. Branton states that "[a]s a rule of evidence, it precludes the
defendant in a personal injury or wrongful death case from introducing evidence that some of the
plaintiffs damages have been paid by a collateral source." Id. It has traditionally applied in tort
cases and "operate[d] to preclude the offsetting of payments made by health and accident
insurance companies or other collateral sources as against the damages claimed by the injured
party." Syl. pt. 7, Ratlief v. Yokum, 280 S.E.2d 584, 585 (W. Va. 1981).
7
LAYCOCK, supra note 50, at 97.
76

Id.

77

458 U.S. 219, 231-32 (1982).

78

Id; see also LAYCOCK, supra note 50, at 97-98 (discussing FordMotor Co., 458 U.S. 219).

7
WILLIAM J. HOLLOWAY & MICHAEL J. LEECH, EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION RIGHTS AND
REMEDIES 705 (2d ed. 1993); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 (1981)

("(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), damages are not recoverable for loss that the injured
party could have avoided without undue risk, burden or humiliation. (2) The injured party is not
precluded from recovery by the rule stated in Subsection (1) to the extent that he has made
reasonable but unsuccessful efforts to avoid loss.").
80

Id
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was available.s8 The purpose of the mitigation rule is to avoid a double
recovery of damages; 8 2 if any employee recovers the wages or salary (the back
pay award) from the first job as well as the replacement job's salary, he will be
in a better position than he would have been prior to termination.83
D.

Other Forms ofEmployment

Beyond the default rule of at-will employment, there are a variety of
other forms of employment relationships including contractual, union, and
public sector. These are all exceptions to at-will employment, and each of these
is governed by its own regulations. The relationships of contracted employees
are governed by the agreed-upon terms of the contract, and any disputes during
the course of the employment are resolved in accordance with those terms. The
relationship between unionized employees and their employers is governed by
the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. 84 Public sector employees
typically include state and county employees such as teachers and postal
employees. These employees can also be unionized. Public sector employeesincluding federal, state, and city employees-cannot be dismissed except for
just cause. The Mason County rule applies to these employment relationships
as well.86
IV. How WEST VIRGINIA APPLIED AND EXTENDED THE COLLATERAL SOURCE
RULE IN LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT CASES: MASON COUNTY, SEYMOUR, AND

PETERS

Now that the basics of employment law and the public policy tort have
been established, this Note shows that the court adopted the de facto collateral
source rule in Mason County so that employees would get a flat back pay award
and extended the rule to front pay in Peters, which allows wrongfully and
maliciously discharged employees to collect a bonanza of damages. This Note
identifies that using the collateral source rule in this way endangers West
Virginia's business environment, and it also points out that the court has failed
to define "malice" and thus prevents employers and employees from being
certain about what is truly a "malicious discharge."

81

Id.

82

Id. at 706.
Marks, supra note 44, at 1391 n.12 (quoting JOHN E. MURRAY JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS

§ 122, at 800 (4th ed. 2001)).
84

PERRITT, supra note 38, at 16.
Id. at 15; see also PERRITT, supra note 60, § 8, at 199-271.
86
See generally Mason County III, 295 S.E.2d 719 (W. Va. 1982) (applying Mason County
rule to a probationary high school principal).
85
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In 1982, The WVSCA held that discharged employees must mitigate
their damages by using reasonable measures to seek comparable employment.8 8
The court recognized that the majority of jurisdictions employ this doctrine.
However, when adopting this majority rule and discarding the old, "primitive"
rule, the court carved a narrow exception: when an employee is maliciously
discharged, this doctrine will not apply to back pay, and the employee can
receive a full back pay award.89 This Note argues that the Mason County rule is
the collateral source rule applied in a labor and employment context. At its
creation, this seemed to be a just and fair rule. After all, the goal of a tort action
is to compensate the victim and to punish the wrongdoer, 90 and an employer
who has maliciously discharged an employee has presumably violated an
employee's right. Additionally, this rule was originally limited in scope
because it applied only to back pay when it was adopted in 1982. But the court
extended it to front pay in Seymour 91 and Peters, 2 and a plaintiff can now
recover front pay for the remainder of his life-or at least until retirement age.
Although the rule applies to a narrow issue, it is applied to all types of
employment cases. Three such types are explained below: public employees
who have contracts, 93 at-will employees,94 and unionized employees.9 5 This
rule, narrow as it may be, has far-reaching consequences for West Virginia
businesses, citizens, and legal jurisprudence. The courts are already seeing the
full effects of Mason County and its progeny. 96 And as employers continue to

87

Id. at 723.

88

Id
Id. at 724.

89

90

Ulciny, supra note 9, at 292.

9

Seymour v. Pendleton Cmty. Care, 549 S.E.2d 662 (W. Va. 2001) (per curiam).
Peters v. Rivers Edge Mining, Inc., 680 S.E.2d 791 (W. Va. 2009).

92

93
94

See Mason County III, 295 S.E.2d at 721.
See Seymour, 549 S.E.2d at 663-64.

See Peters, 680 S.E.2d at 801.
See Brief for the Petitioners, Burke-Parsons-Bowlby Corp. v. Rice, No. 11-0183 (W. Va.
http://www.courtswv.gov/supremeat
available
13,
2011),
May
filed
court/calendar/2012/briefs/septl2/11-0183petitioner.pdf; Supplemental Brief for the Appellants,
W. Va.-Am. Water Co. v. Nagy, No. 101229 (W. Va. 2012), available at
http://www.courtswv.gov/supreme-court/calendar/2012/briefs/septl2/101229appellant.pdf. West
Virginia-American Water Co. v. Nagy settled before oral arguments were held, but BurkeParsons-Bowlby Corp. v. Rice was argued before the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
on September 5, 2012. Supreme Court of Appeals of W. Va., Supreme Court of Appeals
9s

96

Argument

Docket:

Wednesday,

September

5,

2012,

W.

VA.

JUDICIARY,

(last visited
http://www.courtswv.gov/supreme-court/calendar/2012/dockets/sept-5-12ad.html
Oct. 18, 2012) [hereinafter Argument Docket: Sept. 5, 2012]. An opinion has not yet been
published.
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be overwhelmed by excessive damage awards granted under this rule, there will
be damaging effects in the West Virginia business community and economy.97
Mason County Board of Education v. State Superintendent of Schools

A.

To fully understand the de facto collateral source rule's impact on West
Virginia's labor and employment law, it is necessary to look at its origin,
Mason County. An examination of Mason County's holding, facts, and
reasoning show that the rule adopted in 1982-allowing a flat back pay
award-is much more narrow and contained than the current rule, which allows
unmitigated back and front pay awards.
1.

Holding of Mason County

In 1982, the WVSCA held that "[u]nless a wrongful discharge is
malicious," the wrongfully discharged employee must mitigate damages by
seeking similar employment in the local area.98 The wages the employee
receives from that employment or, if the employee fails to meet this
requirement, the wages the employee could have received through comparable
employment will be deducted from his back pay award. 99 However, the
employer has the burden of raising this issue at trial.'o The employee is only
required to use "reasonable and diligent efforts to secure acceptable
employment."' 0 ' The new employment must be in the same line of work; thus,
an employee is not required to accept a lower-status job or a job outside of his
education or training. 0 2 Finally, if the employee's new job is compatible with
the previous job from which he was discharged, the wages the employee
receives from his new job will not be deducted from the employee's back pay
award.'03

9
West Virginia is currently ranked thirty-fourth on the Best/Worst States for Business. JP
Donlon, Another Triumph for Texas: Best/Worst Statesfor Business 2012, CHIEFEXECUTIVE.NET
At 7.5%
(May 2, 2012), http://chiefexecutive.net/best-worst-states-for-business-2012.
unemployment, West Virginia currently has the twenty-fifth worst unemployment rate in the
country. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2012 State Unemployment Rates, NAT'L CONF. OF ST.
2012),
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/labor/2012-state(Sept. 21,
LEGISLATURES
unemployment-rates.aspx. Thus, if West Virginia's unemployment rates and stunted economic
growth correlates to or is caused by our deterrent business or labor laws, then the Mason County
rule and said progeny are only hurting West Virginia's economic problem.
98
Syl. pt. 2, Mason County III, 295 S.E.2d at 720-21.

9

Id

'00

Id

.o. Id at 725.
102

id.

103

Id.
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When a wrongful discharge is malicious, however, the employee is not
required to mitigate damages.' 04 This allows the employee to recover damages
from his employer as well as any wages earned through new employment. The
new employment is the collateral source. By not offsetting the plaintiffs
recovery by the benefits received from the collateral source, the collateral
source rule is applied to the employment relationship. A thorough explanation
of Mason County's history and the court's reasoning shows that the court was
trying to be just and fair to future maliciously discharged plaintiffs by awarding
them a flat back pay award. A back pay award, as previously discussed' 05 is
limited in scope. The 1982 court could not have anticipated that the 2009 court
would extend the Mason County rule to front pay.
2.

Facts of Mason County

The eight years that Mason County spent in the West Virginia court
system earned it the description of a case with a "long and tortuous history" and
"an example of painful judicial delay.", 0 6 The case appeared before the
WVSCA three times.' 07 The appellee, Bright McCausland, was a probationary
school principal at Hannan High School who was discharged from his position
by the Mason County Board of Education ("Board") on September 1, 1972.08
After two school district members said that McCausland was "incompetent and
that he had willfully neglected his duties as school principal," the Board
initiated proceedings to dismiss McCausland.' 09 At a hearing on September 1,
1973, several teachers and other school employees gave evidence supporting
the charges."o The county superintendent testified that he had given
McCausland favorable reviews and that McCausland carried out the
administration's policies."'
The Board ultimately found that there was "sufficient evidence of
seven incidents of incompetence, willful neglect of duty, and intemperance to
justify" dismissing McCausland.1 2 These actions included: (1) he willfully
failed to provide an effective discipline policy at Hannan High School and was

'0

Syl. pt. 2, id. at 720-21.

105

See supra, Part III.C.2.

Id. at 726 (McHugh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
107
See Mason County III, 295 S.E.2d 719 (W. Va. 1982); Mason Cnty. Bd. of Educ. V. State
Superintendent of Sch. (Mason County II), 274 S.E.2d 435 (W. Va. 1980); Mason Cnty. Bd. of
Educ. v. State Superintendent of Sch. (Mason County I), 234 S.E.2d 321 (W. Va. 1977).
108
Mason County III, 295 S.E.2d at 720.
106

109

Mason County II, 274 S.E.2d at 436.

110

Id.

111

Id.

112

Id
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not equipped to handle the discipline problems at the high school; (2) he
exhibited intemperate conduct towards students and teachers including
directing profane language at them; (3) he entered classrooms while class was
in session and proceeded to sleep in the presence of both students and teachers
and slept in other areas of the school; (4) he willfully refused to properly
evaluate teachers and said that "evaluations were purely a social matter and had
nothing to do with their teaching ability"; (5) he willfully refused to follow the
Board's grievance procedures and misrepresented their functions to the
teachers; (6) he lacked a competent educator's attitude toward students; and (7)
he willfully failed to perform his duties as principal." 3 After making these
findings, the Board immediately dismissed McCausland and declared his threeyear contract to be void."14
McCausland appealed to the State Superintendent of Schools
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and argued that the Policies, Rules,
and Regulations of the West Virginia Board of Education only allow an
employee to be dismissed if the supervisor is dissatisfied with the employee's
performance and if that employee has been given time to correct any
inadequate performance.115 The State Superintendent ageed." 6 He ordered
McCausland be reinstated with back pay and interest.' After receiving the
State Superintendent's decision, the Board petitioned the Circuit Court of
Kanawha County for a writ of certiorari."' 8 The court reviewed the petition and
held that the Board lacked standing for judicial review.119
The Board appealed to the WVSCA, which held that a county board of
education does indeed have standing and remanded the case to the circuit
court. 12 0 On remand, the circuit court then upheld the Board's dismissal, and
McCausland appealed.' 2 1 The WVSCA reversed his dismissal stating that the
procedures of the West Virginia Board of Education's policies and regulations
"must be followed in every proceeding under W. Va. Code 18A-2-8 (1969) for
the dismissal of a school employee on the ground of incompetency." 22 Thus,
McCausland must first receive a "professional evaluation of his competency"

13

Id.at436n.1.

114

Id. at 437.

Id. (citing Policies, Rules, and Regulations of the West Virginia Board of Education
VA. CODE R. § 126-141-2.6.a (1983)). McCausland appealed
pursuant to the provisions of W. VA. CODE § 18A-2-8 (1969). Id.
116
id.
"

§5300(6)(a) (codified at W.

117
118

id.
Id. This petition was filed on May 10, 1974. Id.

119

Id

120

id.
Id. at 438.
Syl. pt. 3, id. at 436.

121
122
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and an "improvement period" before any dismissal.12 3 The court ordered that
McCausland be reinstated with back pay.124 The case was again remanded to
the circuit court-this time to determine the amount of back pay-but it
boomeranged back to the WVSCA over a question of whether or not a
discharged employee is required to mitigate damages. 125 The court ultimately
found that McCausland's discharge was not malicious, and the case was again
remanded to the circuit court for the damages award to be decided under the
newly-minted mitigation of damages rule.12 6
3.

Reasoning of the Court

The issue in this case was the "obligation of a wrongfully discharged
employee to mitigate his or her damages by seeking and accepting comparable
employment for which he or she is qualified during the pendency of
litigation." 2 7 The Board, citing Williston on Contracts, argued that
McCausland should not receive a full back pay award and that his damages
should be limited at most to his three-year contract, which expired in 1975.128
But the WVSCA stated that the rule requiring employment to expire at the end
of the agreed-upon contract does not apply to employment contracts of West
Virginia teachers; they have "unique protection" under the West Virginia Board
of Education's policieS.1 29 Rule 5300 provides that even a probationary
employee's teaching contract must be renewed unless certain due process
requirements have been met.130 The WVSCA stated that had McCausland been
accorded his Rule 5300 rights, he would have achieved tenure status.' 3 ' Thus,
the WVSCA found the Board's argument to be without merit.132
In prior cases, wrongfully discharged employees would have received
all back pay from the discharge date to the reinstatement date, with interest. 33
However, the WVSCA decided that it was time for West Virginia to adopt the
majority rule-the rule requiring mitigation of damages-due to rapid changes
in the law regarding the complications in applying school personnel's due
process rights provided by administrative rules and regulations of the State

Syl. pt. 5, id. at 436.
Id. at 439.
125 Mason County III, 295 S.E.2d 719 (W. Va. 1982).
126
Id. at 726.
127
Id. at 722.
128
Id. at 721 (citing 9 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1017 (3d ed. 1967)).
129
Id. at 722.
123

124

130

Id.

131

Id.

132

id

133

id

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol115/iss2/10

20

Moore: Can Damages Be Too Damaging Examining Mason County and Its Progen

CANDAMAGES BE TOO DAMAGING?

2012]

827

Board,13 4 the "enormously technical" nature of these rules and regulations,' 3 5
and the fact that such laws are still developing and thus unpredictable.13 6 Thus,
the WVSCA rejected what it called the "primitive rule" of calculating back pay
as from the date of discharge to the date of reinstatement and adopted the
majority rule: the employee must mitigate damages by seeking other
employment.137 The WVSCA said this adoption should not be surprising;' 3 8 it
had previously remanded a case involving a discharged teacher and directed the
circuit court to consider mitigation of damages.139 The WVSCA said that the
old rule might be easier for the judicial system to apply and might adequately
compensate the injured party, but the old rule's punitive effects were also
imprecise.14 0 By this statement, it is fair to infer that the WVSCA meant that
the exception to this rule-that an employer who maliciously discharges an
employee is estopped from raising this issue-be punitive.
The WVSCA then sought to "illuminate" its new rule and how it would
be applied.141 First, a wrongful discharge plaintiff must prove what he would
have earned during the remainder of his term of employment.14 2 The defendant
must then prove what the plaintiff earned-or by "reasonable diligence" could
have earned-in other employment during that period.143 That employment
must have been of the "same grade, in the same line of work, and in the same
locality." 44 The WVSCA also clarified that if the employee's new job is one
that he could have held while maintaining his old job, then the wages from his
new job would not be deducted from the back pay award.14 5 An example would
be a teacher taking "a night job supervising a federal adult education
program."1 4 6 The WVSCA thus adopted the "majority rule" with the caveat that
"the employer is estopped from asserting the employee's duty to mitigate
where the termination of employment was malicious." 47
The question is: what is "malice"? The WVSCA defined a malicious
discharge as occurring when "the discharging agency or official willfully and

134

i

135

Id. at 723.

136

Id.

137

Id.
id.

138
1
140

Id (citing Burks v. McNeel, 264 S.E.2d 651 (W. Va. 1980)).
id

142

Id
id

143

Id.

144

146

Id at 724 (quoting CHARLES MCCORMICK, DAMAGES §§ 159, 160 (1935)).
Id (quoting Martin v. Bd. of Educ., 199 S.E. 887 (W. Va. 1938)).
id

147

Id

141

145

at 724.
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deliberately violated the employee's rights under circumstances where the
agency or individual knew or with reasonable diligence should have known of
The WVSCA stated that the purpose of this rule
the employee's rights. ...
was to discourage malicious discharges. 14 9 But the WVSCA did not clearly
define what "malicious" means; it simply stated that it is a violation of the
employee's rights. 50 West Virginia's public policies are drawn from a broad
base. An employee or plaintiffs lawyer can look to the federal and state
constitutions, public statutes, judicial decisions, the common law, and the
"acknowledged prevailing concepts of the federal and state governments
relating to and affecting the safety, health, morals and general welfare of the
people"151 to find a cause of action and label it as "malicious." As Richard
Craswell argues, "labels such as willfully, or in bad faith, or fraudulently, or
maliciously-or, as Dickens once put it, 'otherwise evil-adverbiously'"-are
not self-defining nor are they well-defined by legal literature.15 2 Yet these
definitions often determine how large damages will be in a breach of contract
labeled with one or more such adverbs.' 5 3 This prohibits employers from
having any predictability or certainty about what constitutes a "malicious"
discharge, and it also requires employees and their lawyers to go searching for
an action to be considered "malicious." If the WVSCA or the legislature
defined "malice," then both parties would know exactly what constitutes a
"malicious discharge" and what the consequences of their actions would be.
Once the employer has raised the affirmative defense of the mitigation
of damages and has met its burden of proof, the "wrongfully discharged
employee who has not secured employment must be prepared to demonstrate
that he or she did not make a voluntary decision not to work, but rather used
reasonable and diligent efforts to secure acceptable employment." 5 4 If the
second employment has the same or higher salary than the employment from
which the employee was wrongfully discharged "so that effectively all damages
are mitigated [,] the employee is still entitled" to attorney's fees and litigation
expenses.1ss

148

Id. at 725.

149

id.

"' Id. at 722.
Cordle v. Gen. Hugh Mercer Corp., 325 S.E.2d 111, 114 (W. Va. 1984).
152
Richard Craswell, When is a Willful Breach "Willful"? The Link Between Definitions and
Damages, 107 MICH. L. REv. 1501, 1501 (2009) (quoting CHARLES DICKENS, A TALE OF Two
CITIES 47 (Courier Dover Publ'ns 1998) (1859)).
153
Id
154
Mason County III, 295 S.E,2d at 725-26.
15s
Id. at 726.
151
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Mason County Progeny: Seymour v. Pendleton Community Care &
Peters v. Rivers Edge Mining, Inc.

B.

The Mason County decision focused on school personnel-all of whom
typically have a contract-and only addressed the issue of back pay. The
WVSCA did not address any other types of compensatory damages and
whether they could or should be affected by this rule. The WVSCA did not
give objective standards for how juries were to decide if conduct was
"malicious."' 5 6 Further, while the Mason County court declared McCausland's
discharge to not be malicious, it did not explicitly state whether this finding
should be a question of law or of fact. Therefore, Mason County's progeny
were left to answer these questions and, in doing so, extended and further
shaped this rule.
1.

Seymour v. Pendleton Community Care Implicitly Extended
Mason County to Front Pay

In 2001 in Seymour v. Pendleton Community Care,s7 the WVSCA
applied the Mason County rule to an at-will employment issue. Michael Judy,
the manager of Pendleton Community Care ("PCC") discharged Barbara
Seymour on March 28, 1998, from her position as office manager, claiming
that she had engaged in "insubordinate behavior" and had refused "to adhere to
Seymour brought a retaliatory discharge action
management policies."
against both Judy and PCC, claiming that her termination was in retaliation for
her complaining about the falsification and lack of records that PCC is required
by law to maintain.15 9
The jury was instructed that if it found that Seymour was "discharged
out of malice [and] .. . [PCC] willfully and deliberately violated Mrs.

Seymour's rights under circumstances where [PCC] knew, or with reasonable
diligence should have known, of Mrs. Seymour's rights to be free from
retaliatory discharge then Barbara Seymour is entitled to a flat back pay
award," which was "back pay from the date of discharge to the date of trial
together with interest."' 60
The circuit court jury awarded Seymour $70,000 in past lost earnings,
$125,000 in future lost earnings, $30,000 in emotional damages, $500 in
medical damages, $500 for future medical damages, and a total of $300,000 in

56
's7

'

See Craswell, supra note 152, at 1501.
549 S.E.2d 662 (W. Va. 2001) (per curiam).
Id. at 664.

159

Id

160

Id. at 664 n.1.
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punitive damages. 16 ' The judge reduced the $70,000 for past lost earnings to
$42,921 because that was more accurate per her salary' 62 and lowered the
punitive damages award because it "was appropriate to keep the punitive
damages award proportional." 63 The judge found that Seymour failed to
mitigate her damages and consequently eliminated the $125,000 front pay
award.' He did not reduce her back pay award, per Mason County, and instead
eliminated her front pay award.165
On appeal, the WVSCA restored the full punitive damages award and
restored the $125,000 front pay award.16 6 The WVSCA made no mention of the
fact that the lower court had modified the front pay award instead of the back
pay award as per Mason County.'67 There was no mention of reinstatement as a
remedy.'68 The WVSCA declared Seymour's discharge to be malicious.169 The
majority opinion also declared that Seymour made reasonable efforts to
mitigate, which prompted two judges to vigorously dissent this point.170 But by

161

Id. at 665. Michael Judy was to pay $100,000, and $200,000 was to be obtained from PCC.

Id
162

id.

163

Id.

'"

Id

165

id

166
167

Id at 667.
Id.

168

id.

id.
Id. When discussing the requirement to mitigate damages, another problematic question is
what constitutes "reasonable" efforts to find comparable employment. This discussion is beyond
the scope of this Note, but Seymour is an example of how even judges disagree on how to define
"reasonable" in this context. Seymour testified that she "watched the paper, and [she had] kept
her eye on things-and kept an eye for what's out there, and kept [her] eyes open. [She] just
ha[dn't] gone to apply." Id at 664. She started staining glass at home, she had sold one or two
pieces, and she hoped to sell more. Id. Although the majority opinion declared her discharge to
be malicious, three justices filed dissenting opinions regarding this issue. Justice Robin Jean
Davis both dissented and concurred. She dissented from the majority's finding that Seymour
made reasonable attempts to mitigate her damages: "[T]here is absolutely no evidence that such
mitigation occurred," and "[s]uch finding is just plain wrong." Id. at 668-69 (Davis, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part). An employee who must mitigate must use "'reasonable
and diligent efforts' to obtain acceptable, replacement employment," and Seymour's actions did
not meet this standard. Id. at 669 (quoting Mason County III, 295 S.E.2d 719, 726 (W. Va.
1982)). However, Justice Davis concurred with the holding saying that because Seymour's
discharge was found to be malicious she had no duty to mitigate. Id Chief Justice Elliott
Maynard dissented with the majority's entire opinion, indicating rather that he would affirm the
trial court's order. Id. at 669 (Maynard, J., dissenting). Finally, Justice Larry Starcher concurred
with Justice Davis and emphasized that the defendant has the burden of proving the plaintiffs
failure to mitigate. Id. at 669 (Starcher, J., concurring). The issues he discussed in his
concurrence regarded the defense's trial strategy: he thought that the defense should have called
169

170
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allowing Seymour to recover $125,000 in future lost earnings-the front pay
award-the WVSCA impliedly extended the Mason County malicious
discharge rule to front pay. The Mason County rule had only discussed back
pay; it did not discuss front pay. Thus, although the WVSCA did not explicitly
state that it was extending the Mason County rule that a maliciously-discharged
employee can receive a full back pay award and not be required to mitigate a
front pay award, the WVSCA applied the Mason County rule to front pay when
it gave Seymour the full, non-mitigated front pay award of $125,000.
2.

Peters v. Rivers Edge Mining, Inc. Explicitly Extended Mason
County to Front Pay

The most recent extension' 7 ' of the Mason County rule was in 2009 in
Peters v. Rivers Edge Mining, Inc.172 In Peters, the WVSCA explicitly
extended the Mason County rule to front pay. Now a maliciously discharged
employee can recover back pay, emotional distress damages, punitive damages,
and front pay damages without mitigation if the jury finds the discharge to be
malicious. Thus, upon a finding of malicious discharge, the employee can
recover damages at least until retirement age.
George M. Peters was a coal miner and a unionized employee at Rivers
Edge Mining, Inc. ("Rivers Edge").17 3 Peters broke his wrist while hanging
cable underground and was later terminated when he did not show up for his
return-to-work shift.174 He filed suit against Rivers Edge alleging that his

Seymour to the stand when it presented its evidence of available work in the area in the form of
newspaper advertisements. Id. Instead, the defense presented those advertisements during its
case-in-chief, and did not place Seymour on the stand to question her regarding the
advertisements. Id.
'7'
On September 5, 2012, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals heard arguments in
Burke-Parsons-Bowlby Corp. v. Rice, which challenged the Mason County rule as a unlawful
punitive damages award in that it does not have proper due process constraints. Brief for the
Petitioners, supra note 96, at 30-35.
172
680 S.E.2d 791 (W. Va. 2009).
17

Id. at 800.

174 Id. He was placed in the Transitional Work Program to work as a coal hauler while his
wrist healed. Id. He fulfilled that position for approximately five months until his doctor reported
that his wrist was not healing properly and recommended that he stop working. Id. Peters
received workers' compensation temporary total disability benefits during the two months that he
did not work. Id. On Monday, May 10, 2004, his workers' compensation case manager received a
call from the Transitional Work Program to say that Rivers Edge could accommodate Peters and
his employment restrictions. Id. at 801. The manager of the Transitional Work Program called
the number Peters had provided in his personnel information, which happened to be Peters's
mother's home. Id Peters did not live with his mother. Id. The manager left a message, and then
called twice more and left two more messages. Id. Peters spoke with his mother the night of May
11; at this time, his regular work shift had begun. Id The following morning, Peters called his
manager, who informed him that he would return to work in the Transitional Work Program. Id.
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termination from employment was a retaliatory discharge that violated
workers' compensation statutes.17 5 Rivers Edge responded that Peters had been
fired for violating the collective bargaining agreement's two-day rule.'7 6 The
jury found his discharge to be malicious. The circuit court jury awarded Peters
$171,697 for back pay; $513,410 for front pay; $200,000 for aggravation,
inconvenience, humiliation, embarrassment, and loss of dignity; and
$1,000,000 for punitive damages. 77
On appeal, Rivers Edge argued, inter alia, that the circuit court erred
when it upheld the jury's $513,410 front pay award. Rivers Edge argued that
the workers' compensation statutes are "silent" as to whether front pay is a
proper remedy and that because those statutes simply codified the common law
retaliatory discharge action, only common law remedies for a workers'
compensation retaliatory discharge claim should be available. Reinstatement
was not a remedy for retaliatory discharge; thus, Rivers Edge argued that "front
pay, which is a substitute for reinstatement," is not an appropriate remedy. 7 8
Second, Rivers Edge argued that the legislature did not intend for a
workers' compensation discrimination employee to be reinstated because it
knew "the law in existence at the time it enacted the workers' compensation
discrimination statutes," and "front pay should not be read into the statutes as a
remedy for such discrimination when the Legislature made no such
designation."' 79
Third, Rivers Edge contended that "even if front pay [was] an
appropriate remedy in this case," there was not enough evidence to support the
amount of front pay that was awarded.1 80 This contention was based on the fact
that the amount awarded was speculative because it extended too far into the
future.18'
The circuit court, in its discretion, made a preliminary finding that
reinstatement was not an appropriate remedy for this case.18 2 Thus, the two
issues in this case were whether Peters was entitled to a front pay award and, if
so, whether the evidence supported the amount awarded.'83
The WVSCA responded that the relevant statute is a codification of the
common law, which at that time found that a retaliatory discharge of an

"7
176
177

Id.; see W. VA. CODE § 23-5A-3(b) (1990); W. VA. CODE § 23-5A-1 (1978).
Peters, 680 S.E.2d at 801.

179

Id at 803.
Id at 810.
Id.

180

Id.

81

Id

182

Id.at811.
id

178

183
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employee for filing a workers' compensation claim "sounds in tort."' 84
Reinstatement was not historically recognized as a "remedy for the tort of
retaliatory discharge" because this tort was "fashioned as an exce tion" to atwill employment; therefore, damages were the appropriate remedy. 8 But other
states, such as Tennessee and Illinois, have accepted reinstatement as a remedy
for retaliatory discharge.' 86 West Virginia recognizes reinstatement to be an
appropriate remedy for an employee who is wrongfully discharged for whistleblowing,
wrongfully discharged in violation of tenure,188 and wrongfully
discharged for a good-faith violation of a civil right.'89 But reinstatement is not
appropriate when "the wrongful discharge is precipitated by or results in a
hostile relationship between the employee and employer";' 90 in those cases,
front pay is "an acceptable substitute."' 9 The decision of whether reinstatement
is appropriate "rest[s] within a circuit court's discretion."l 9 2 Thus, the WVSCA
extended the option of receiving reinstatement or front pay to retaliatory
discharge actions.' 93
The next question for the WVSCA to consider was whether the amount
of front pay that the jury awarded-$5 13,410-was excessive. 19 4 The jury
considered Peters's age, retirement, and life expectancy.1 95 The WSCA stated
that Rivers Edge could not argue that Peters failed to mitigate his damages
because his discharge was malicious.' 9 6 Thus, the WVSCA upheld the jury's
award of front pay and, in doing so, explicitly extended the Mason County rule
to front pay awards. The WVSCA said that the factors that the jury could
consider-age, retirement, and life expectancy-were facts that had been
considered in "calculating awards for lost future earnings in other cases."' 9 7

Id (citing Shanholtz v. Monongahela Power Co., 270 S.E.2d 178,182 (W. Va. 1980)).
185 Id (quoting Harless v. First Nat'1 Bank of Fairmont, 289 S.E.2d 692, 703 (W. Va. 1982)).
184

Id. at 812 (citing Eddins v. Geneva Farms, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 413, 421 (E.D. Tenn. 1994);
Skirpan v. United Air Lines, Inc., No. 83 C 0447, 1989 WL 84463, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 21, 1989)
(memorandum decision)).
187 Id (citing Thompson v. Town of Alderson, 600 S.E.2d 290 (W. Va. 2004)).
188 Id. (citing Syl. pt. 3, Bonnell v. Carr, 294 S.E.2d 910 (W. Va. 1982)).
189

Id. at 801 (citing Martin v. Mullins, 294 S.E.2d 161, 165 (W. Va. 1982)).

190

Id. at 812.

191

Id.

192

id.
193 Id. at 813.
194

'9

id
Id. at 814.

196

id

197

Id at 815.
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An Opportunity to Untangle Mason County: How BurkeParsons-Bowlby Corp. v. Rice Could Modify Mason County

and Its Progeny
Jerold John Rice Jr. was employed as a staff accountant and credit
manager at the Burke-Parsons-Bowlby Corporation ("BPB"), a Ripley, West
Virginia-based company that produced railroad ties, fence posts, fence boards,
guardrail posts, and log homes. 198 Rice worked at BPB's corporate
headquarters in Ripley.199 When BPB's controller retired in August 2006, Rice
filled the position. oo He worked as BPB's controller until March 2009, which
is when the position was eliminated.20 1
On April 1, 2008, Stella-Jones Inc., a Canadian corporation, acquired
BPB through a share acquisition through its holding corporation, Stella-Jones
U.S. Holding Corporation. 20 2 After the acquisition, Stella-Jones initially
retained all BPB employees, including Rice. 20 3 At that time, Rice was forty-six
years old. 2 04 In August 2008, Stella-Jones appointed Eric Vachon as Vice
205wafrmteCndn
President of Finance of U.S. Operations. Vachon was from the Canadian
headquarters, and his job was to "facilitate the integration of the operations of
the BPB and Stella-Jones operations."20 6 Vachon was Rice's supervisor.20 7 In
February 2009, Vachon sought to re-structure the BPB's Ripley finance
position at BPB,
department.208 This re-structuring eliminated the controller
which was the position that Rice held at that time.209 Vachon informed Rice
that his position-and therefore his employment-had been eliminated. 2 10 Rice
was forty-seven years old.2 11
On April 9, 2009, Rice filed suit against BPB alleging age
212
At trial in
discrimination under the West Virginia Human Rights Act.
Jackson County, West Virginia, the court applied the Mason County rule, and
19

Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 96, at 2.

199
200

Id.
Id.

201

Id

202

Id

203

Id. at 3.

204

id
Id.
id

205
206
207

Id

208

Id. at 5.

209

id

210

Id.

211

Id.
Id

212
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the jury found in Rice's favor and awarded him $142,659 in unmitigated back
pay and $1,991,332 in unmitigated front pay.2 13 The front pay award is the
amount of twenty years of front pay because the expert witness calculated the
front pay award based on a retirement age of sixty-seven years.2 14 The award
totaled $2,113,991, and the jury did not assign punitive damages. 215
On appeal, BPB argued that the "application of and extension of Mason
County to allow an unmitigated, unlimited award of back pay and front pay
damages ... amounts to a punitive damage award without any of the due
process constraints applied to awards of punitive damages." 2 16 BPB argued that
the "standard articulated by Mason County for determining if an employer's
action [sic] are malicious is essentially a punitive damages standard." 2 17
Therefore, the Garnes factors for due process considerations must be included
in the jury instructions.2 18
In response to BPB's arguments, Rice argued that the WVSCA has
already established that "unmitigated wage loss damages and punitive damages
are not the same. Even when not mitigated, a wage loss award is still
compensatory in nature.",2 19 However, the case upon which Rice relies is a
memorandum decision that actually was appealed and set to be argued before
the WVSCA adjacent to Burke-Parsons v. Rice on September 5, 2012.220 The
case settled prior to oral argument. 22 1 Rice further argues that because wage
loss damages are compensatory in nature and not punitive, the Garnes factors

cannot apply. 22 2
Oral argument was held on September 5, 2012.223 During argument, the
justices raised a number of policy considerations, including many that surround

2'

Id. at 6, 10.

Brief for the Respondents at 14, Burke-Parsons-Bowlby Corp., No. 11-0183 (W. Va. June
27, 2011), available at http://www.courtswv.gov/supreme-court/calendar/2012/briefs/septl2/110183respondent.pdf.
215 Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 96, at 6. Also, it was revealed during argument that
Rice is now deceased. Oral Argument, Burke-Parsons-BowlbyCorp., No. 11-0183 (W. Va. Sept.
5, 2012) (The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia does not publish transcripts or provide
recordings of oral arguments, but author was present during the hearing).
214

216

Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 96, at 30-31.

21

Id. at 33.

Id. at 31; see Syl. pt. 3, Games v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 897 (W. Va. 1991).
218
For a discussion of the factors, see infra Part VI.B.
219
Brief for the Respondents, supra note 214, at 17 (quoting W. Va. Am. Water Co. v. Nagy,
No. 101229 (W. Va. June 15, 2011) (memorandum decision)).
220
Argument Docket: Sept. 5, 2012, supra note 96.
221
Oral Argument, supra note 215.
222 Brief for the Respondents, supra note 214, at 17.
223 Argument Docket: Sept. 5, 2012, supra note 96.
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the collateral source rule.224 For example, Justice Robin Jean Davis questioned
why the defendant should get the benefit of the plaintiff seeking and finding
other employment. 22 5 Both BPB and Rice stated that West Virginia is the only
state in the country with a damages rule like Mason County.226
Both parties argued well, and the substance of the discussion revealed
the murkiness and undefined nature of the Mason County rule. For example,
Rice argued that the WVSCA has found all wage loss damages-including
those provided by Mason County-to be compensatory, yet Rice then justified
Mason County's very existence using the collateral source rule as an
example.227 The problem is that the collateral source rule is punitive in nature;
it was created to address a tort where the goal was not only to make the injured
party whole but to also, quite intentionally, punish the defendant. Additionally,
Rice stated that the Mason County rule is akin to the collateral source rule and
provided the example of a car accident and compared the employer to the
tortfeasor driver and the employee to the innocent victim. 2 28 Justice Brent D.
Benjamin responded that there are "different policy considerations" at play
when using the collateral source rule in that context.2 29
Justice Benjamin is correct. The policy considerations present in a
situation where the collateral source rule should be applied and the policy
considerations present in wrongful discharge cases are quite different. The
problem is that the Mason County damages rule is the collateral source rule
applied in an employment context. Therefore, it is time to untangle Mason
County's thirty years of growth, clearly state its policy considerations, and
articulate its exact standards and proper method of application.
V. MASON COUNTY, THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE, AND WRONGFUL
DISCHARGE CASES

As discussed previously, the collateral source rule allows the injured
party to recover from both the wrongdoer and a third-party, collateral source.
The Mason County rule operates in the same manner. In recent years, some
jurisdictions have decided to apply the collateral source rule to wrongful
discharge cases, 23 0 but it usually involves unemployment benefits or workers

Oral Argument, supra note 215. The justices present were Justice Margaret L. Workman,
Justice Davis, Chief Justice Menis E. Ketchum, Justice Brent D. Benjamin, and Justice Thomas
E. McHugh.
224

225

226
227
228

229
230

Id
id.
Id
id

d.
Marks, supranote 44, at 1430 n.243.
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compensation benefits. 231 As of yet, this author has not found a rule like the
Mason County rule in any other jurisdiction. No other jurisdictions appear to
have considered whether or not the contracts rule of mitigation of damages
should be replaced with the collateral source rule in a wrongful discharge case.
As the WVSCA noted in Mason County, this is the majority rule. 2 32 It is
contradictory that, in the midst of reigning in the collateral source rule
concerning medical professional liability, the West Virginia courts have
actually expanded the scope of this rule in the labor and employment context.
The Mason County rule is applied to all types of employment cases without
discrimination: at-will, union, and state employees covered by contracts (e.g.,
teachers). Indeed, not only have the courts indiscriminately applied the rule, but
the WVSCA continued to broaden the rule's reach. Mason County began with
back pay: a maliciously discharged employee could receive a flat back pay
award. But in 2009, only three years ago, the WVSCA extended the no-duty-of
mitigation rule to front pay: now a maliciously discharged employee can
receive front pay for the rest of his or her life. Other jurisdictions temper the
potency of front pay awards by requiring employees to make reasonable efforts
to search for comparable employment and cutting off front pay awards when
233
subsequent employment begins or reasonably should have begun. But the
WVSCA removed that duty and now allows a maliciously discharged employee
to recover future earnings from the time of discharge until retirement age
without ever having to search for new employment.
Another question to consider is why the WVSCA applied the de facto
collateral source rule to labor and employment situations. Is the Mason County
rule truly necessary to punish the defendant and compensate the wrongfully
discharged plaintiff, or are these policy concerns satisfied by the fact thatunder the majority rule-a wrongfully discharged employee can already
recover compensatory, emotional distress, and punitive damages? After all, the
majority rule requires only that the employee take reasonablemeasures to find
comparable employment. The employee is not required to uproot her home or
take an inferior job. The Mason County court said that it was rejecting the

"In some cases, the cause of action is less important than the source of the collateral
benefits. When the benefit is derived from the state's unemployment compensation statute,
legislative intent becomes a factor in deciding whether the collateral source rule should apply."
Ulciny, supra note 9, at 280; see also Joseph M. Perillo, The CollateralSource Rule in Contract
Cases, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 705 (2009).
232
Mason County III, 295 S.E.2d 719, 723 (W. Va. 1982).
233
See e.g., Cassino v. Reichhold Chemicals, Inc., 817 F.2d 1338, 1347 (9th Cir. 1987) ("It is
clear that front pay awards, like backpay awards, must be reduced by the amount plaintiff could
earn using reasonable mitigation efforts."); Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724,
728 (2d Cir. 1984) ("[T]he duty to mitigate damages by seeking employment elsewhere
significantly limits the amount of front pay available."); Kempfer v. Automated Finishing, Inc.,
564 N.W.2d 692, 701 (Wis. 1997) ("In those situations where reinstatement is not feasible an
award of front pay is still limited by the concepts of foreseeability and mitigation.").
231
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"primitive rule" of awarding a flat back pay award in every case and that it also
wanted to alleviate the financial burden on the state and government (i.e.,
taxpayers).2 34 But taking a closer look at the policies behind the collateral
source rule provides better understanding of the rule's actual effect and perhaps
the court's motive.
There are several policies for the collateral source rule, and some have
even waffled over the decades as the rule has been swamped with controversy.
Some groups argue that the collateral source rule should be discarded because it
provides the plaintiff with a double recovery.235 Others argue that double
recovery should not be a concern because it is better to reward the plaintiffthe injured party-than the defendant.236 Another group argues that there is no
way to filly compensate a tort victim for the wrong that has been done to
him.237 Yet others say that the blameworthy defendant should not be able to
benefit in any way from payments made to the plaintiff; the defendant should
have to pay the full amount of the injury he has caused the plaintiff regardless
of whether the plaintiff has been partially or fully compensated by a third
party. 238
No matter the motive, the effect of the rule is to benefit the plaintiff
and punish the defendant. On its face this may seem appropriate, but by
extending the rule to front pay, the West Virginia courts have opened the
monetary floodgates. This now means that if an employer discharges an
employee and a jury happens to find it malicious (and malice is not welldefined), that employer is now responsible for paying not only back pay,
emotional distress damages, and punitive damages, but also the same amount of
money as if he were to employ the plaintiff until retirement, which as in the
Burke-Parsons case, could be twenty or more years. Emotional distress
damages and punitive damages can be massive in quantity-the Peters plaintiff
received one million dollars in punitive damages alone. The question becomes:
what does this mean for labor and employment in West Virginia?
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

Both the West Virginia courts and the legislature should consider what
the employment and business environment in West Virginia. These high

Mason County III, 295 S.E.2d at 723.
235
Branton, supra note 11, at 885-86.
236
Id. at 884; see also Nora J. Pasman-Green & Ronald D. Richards Jr., Who is Winning the
Collateral Source Rule War? The Battlegroundin the Sixth Circuit States, 31 U. TOL. L. REv.
425, 429 (2000).
237
Branton, supra note 11, at 885 (citing Hudson v. Lazarus, 217 F.2d 344, 346 (D.C. Cir.
1954) (The basis reasoning behind this argument is that a plaintiff must pay the attorney out of
his recovery; therefore, he does not receive the full recovery granted by the court.)).
Id. at 884-85 (citing Grayson v. Williams, 256 F.2d 61, 65 (10th Cir. 1958)).
238
234
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damage awards will certainly affect the labor and employment markets just as
they sparked a strong movement for tort reform. Thus, the WVSCA and
legislature should start considering their options. Below are five options: the
first is original and only applies to the instant problem, and the following four
options have been used or considered in regard to limiting large awards to
plaintiffs in employment actions.
A.

Eradicatethe Malicious DischargeException to the Mason County
Rule RequiringEmployees to Mitigate TheirDamages

The first option is for the WVSCA to overrule the Mason County
"malicious discharge" exception. The rule that discharged employees take
reasonable steps to mitigate damages is not exceptional. It is not unusual. It is,
as the court stated in Mason County, the majority rule. But the malicious
discharge exception that the court carved out in Mason County in 1982 is both
exceptional and unusual. Moreover, the exception is problematic for West
Virginia's business climate and work ethic, and it is unnecessary because the
majority rule sufficiently addresses all relevant policy concerns.
First, if the state wishes to retain the businesses that already exist in
West Virginia and to continue to grow the economy by attracting new
businesses, then the state should not have a law that allows a discharged
employee to receive unearned pay until retirement. If an employer has indeed
maliciously discharged an employee, which is difficult to determine because
"malice" is not defined, then perhaps that employer should be punished, which
is the purpose of the collateral source rule. However, applying the collateral
source rule to front pay as did the court in Peters is excessive. Compensatory
damages for back and front pay, emotional distress damages, and punitive
damages are perfectly adequate to make the plaintiff whole and to punish the
employer for wrongdoing.
Second, the collateral source rule-as created in Mason County and
extended to front pay in Peters-does not encourage plaintiff employees to
seek new employment. This does not encourage a strong workforce. The
majority rule does not require a plaintiff employee to seek new employment,
but the wages he could have earned if he had reasonably done so will be
deducted from his award. This is not unreasonable. The plaintiff will still
receive what he is justly owed for being wrongfully discharged, and he will still
be responsible for his own livelihood and for being a productive, engaged
member of society.
Third, removing the malicious discharge exception properly addresses
and provides equilibrium for both parties' policy concerns while still ultimately
placing the financial burden on the defendant. The majority rule is quite simple:
it requires only that the plaintiff take reasonable steps to find comparable
employment. Again, it does not require the employee to leave the local area to
find employment, nor is she required to taken an inferior job. The defendant
will still be punished by punitive damages if the jury decides that the defendant
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deserves such punishment. If the plaintiff finds comparable employment and
her damages are thus mitigated, she will still be made whole by her back pay,
front pay, and emotional distress awards (in addition to her punitive damage
award). If the plaintiff is unable to find comparable employment, which may be
especially challenging in a recession, she will be provided for by the defendant
because the majority rule requires that the defendant pay her unmitigated front
pay. In summary, if the plaintiff makes a reasonable effort to find comparable
employment, she will be financially provided for either through her new job or
by the defendant.
B.

Apply the Games Factorsto the UnmitigatedFrontand Back Pay
Awards

Another option is applying the Garnes factors to unmitigated front and
back pay awards as petitioner's counsel in Burke-Parsons v. Rice suggested.
The premise of this argument is that the Mason County malicious discharge
exception is punitive in nature. 2 39 As Burke-Parson's counsel argued, "[t]he
Due Process Clause requires a jury to measure entitlement to punitive damages
by the amounts of harm suffered and prohibits 'grossly excessive or arbitrary
punishments."' 2 4 0 In order to ensure that an award is constitutional, the Garnes
factors should be used to weed out those awards that are arbitrary and
excessive. The Garnes factors are as follows:
(1) Punitive damages should bear a reasonable relationship to
the harm that is likely to occur from the defendant's conduct as
well as to the harm that actually has occurred. If the
defendant's actions caused or would likely cause in a similar
situation only slight harm, the damages should be relatively
small. If the harm is grievous, the damages should be greater.
(2) The jury may consider (although the court need not
specifically instruct on each element if doing so would be
unfairly prejudicial to the defendant), the reprehensibility of
the defendant's conduct. The jury should take into account how
long the defendant continued in his actions, whether he was
aware his actions were causing or were likely to cause harm,
whether he attempted to conceal or cover up his actions or the
harm caused by them, whether/how often the defendant
engaged in similar conduct in the past, and whether the
defendant made reasonable efforts to make amends by offering
a fair and prompt settlement for the actual harm caused once
his liability became clear to him.

239
240

Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 96, at 30-31.
Id. at 32 (citing Perrine v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 694 S.E.2d 815 (W. Va. 2010)).
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(3) If the defendant profited from his wrongful conduct, the
punitive damages should remove the profit and should be in
excess of the profit, so that the award discourages future bad
acts by the defendant.
(4) As a matter of fundamental fairness, punitive damages
should bear a reasonable relationship to compensatory
damages.
(5) The financial position of the defendant is relevant. 2 4 1
Although this approach correctly recognizes that the malicious discharge
exception is punitive in nature, it does not adequately address the problem.
Overruling Mason County and adopting the majority rule is a more effective
solution. Requiring courts to apply the Garnes factors to the wage loss awards
does not change the fact that the plaintiff is still recovering both punitive
damages and unmitigated wage loss awards. To apply the Garnes factors is
adding more work for the courts, and it is an even more complicated task for
jurors-who likely do not fully understand the differences among all the
different types of damages and the need for due process constraints-to first
determine the damage award and then try to apply the factors appropriately to
reduce the award.
In sum, although this approach correctly states that the Mason County
rule is punitive in nature and is inappropriate, it is not the best solution. It is
administratively cumbersome. The best solution is to simply overrule Mason
County, which would reinstate the majority rule: a plaintiff should make
reasonable efforts to find comparable employment.
C.

StatutorilyReform Employment Law with an Arbitration Model

Third, the legislature could consider reforming at-will employment
using a model such as that proposed by Robert Bastress, a law professor at
West Virginia University College of Law, in A Synthesis and a Proposalfor
Reform of the Employment At-Will Doctrine.2 42 Professor Bastress discussed
the conflicting interests of employers and employees in wrongful discharge
litigation. He argues that employers do not have a "legitimate interest in
retaining the right to unjustly fire an employee, [but] they do have valid,
substantial interests in maintaining a dependable workforce and avoiding both
extended litigation and the threat of six- or seven-figure verdicts."24 3

Syl. pt. 3, Games v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 897, 899-900 (W. Va. 1991),
modified by Perrine,694 S.E.2d at 882-83.
242
Bastress, supra note 32.
243
id. at 346.
241
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Employees have "substantial interests in a procedure that provides a fast,
affordable remedy for a wrongful discharge" that is both reliable and fair. 24 4
Professor Bastress proposes an "alternative system [that is] analogous
to arbitration in the collective bargaining context." 245 This system would be a
just-cause system, meaning that employees would be able to bring suit under a
tort cause of action for any discharge that was not for just cause and would
have access to all legal and equitable remedies. 2 46 "just cause" is a term of art
that "encompasses inadequate performance, misconduct, and economic
necessity."24 7 Employers would then "be able to raise as a qualified defense the
offer, or actual results, of an arbitration procedure that meets certain minimum
standards."24 8 Professor Bastress compares this to "buy[ing] the insurance of
arbitration or run[ning] the risks of expensive litigation and a sizeable

verdict." 24 9
In Professor Bastress's arbitration model, the "arbitrator's decision or
the offer of arbitration. should bar the employee's tort recovery" if the
arbitration meets the standards of his model. 2 50 For the arbitration standards to
be fair and adequate, they must include four elements. First, there must be "an
opportunity for a full and fair hearing before an arbitrator who is (a) provided
by the government; (b) selected by agreement of the employee, his
representative, and the employer; or (c) selected by a neutral person or
organization" that the parties have agreed upon. 25 1 Second, the employer should
pay procedural costs. 25 2 Third, the arbitrator must have the discretion "to award
partial or complete relief ... including reinstatement, backpay, back benefits,
and back seniority."2 53 The fourth element requires that formal, timely notice of
discharge be given to the employee.254 This notice must include the reason for
discharge and "a description of the full range of rights available to the

employee." 25 5

244
245
246
247
248
249

250

id
id
id
Id. at 347.
Id. at 346.
Id
Id. at 347.

251

id
Id. These costs include arbitration fees, the employee's attorney fees, and any expert
witness fees. Id.
252

253

id.

254

id
Id. The list of rights must include "notice of the right to engage an attorney (or, at the
employee's election, some other representative) whose fee will be paid by the employer and to
have the representative join in the selection of the arbitrator." Id.
255
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As with Montana's Wrongful Discharge Employment Act, Professor
Bastress suggests that an exception be provided for probationary employees.
An employer may require "an evaluation period as a means for selecting
employees for permanent hiring and achieving the best possible workforce."2 56
At the conclusion of the probationary period, "the employer may release
individuals without the same demonstration of just cause as would be required
for permanent employees."257 For this exception to work, however, employers
would have to provide "notice of the probationary status to employees and a
specific, reasonable duration for the probationary status."258
D.

Enact a Damages Limitation Statute

Fourth, the legislature could consider adopting a damage limitation
statute that would prohibit the collateral source rule in labor and employment
situations. West Virginia Code Section 55-7B-9a(a) applies to the Medical
Professional Liability Act ("MPLA") and changes the way the collateral source
rule is applied in MPLA lawsuits. 2 59 This statute allows the defendant to show
that the plaintiff has already received payments from other sources. 2 60 The
defendant would present this evidence after the verdict and before the judgment
is entered. 26 1 The defendant can even produce evidence of future payments
from collateral sources if the court determines that (1) the collateral source has
a "preexisting contractual or statutory obligation . .. to pay the benefits;" 2 62 (2)
there is a reasonable degree of certainty that the benefits "will be paid to the
plaintiff for expenses the trier of fact has determined the plaintiff will incur in
the future; 2 63 and (3) the amount of the future expenses is readily reducible to a
,,264
However, if the plaintiff made payments to secure the right to
sum certain.
those collateral source benefits (such as insurance), the plaintiff may present
evidence of such payments. 2 65 The court can make findings of fact that will
allow the plaintiff to receive a "net amount of collateral source payments."2 66 In

256

Id at 349.

257

id.
id.
259
See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-9a (LexisNexis 2008); Thomas J. Humey & Jennifer M.
Mankins, Medical ProfessionalLiability Litigation in West Virginia: PartII, 114 W. VA. L. REV.
573, 590 (2012).
260 Hurney & Mankins, supra note 259, at 590-91; see W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-9a.
261 Humey & Mankins, supra note 259, at 590-91; see W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-9a(a).
262 Hurney & Mankins, supra note 259, at 590-91; see W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-9a(b).
263 Humey & Mankins, supranote 259, at 590-91; see W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-9a(b).
264 Hurney & Mankins, supra note 259, at 590-91; see W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-9a(b).
265 Humey & Mankins, supra note 259, at 590-91; see W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-9a(c).
266 Humey & Mankins, supra note 259, at 590-91; see W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-9a(e).
258
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other words, the plaintiff will receive the full benefit of having made those
initial payments to secure the collateral source benefits. This way, the potential
damages award is offset so that the plaintiff will not receive double what would
otherwise be awarded but will still be compensated enough to punish the
defendant.
This statute codifies what is essentially the mitigation of damages rule.
Extending this statute to the labor and employment context would provide both
employer and employee with certainty and predictability. However, because the
court created the Mason County rule, it is probably best that the court be the
entity to undo the rule.
E.

The Montana Model: The Wrongful Dischargefrom Employment Act

Finally, the legislature could consider enacting a Wrongful Discharge
from Employment Act ("WDEA")267 as Montana did in 1987. This act defines
wrongful discharge 2 68 and the remedies a wrongfully discharged employee may
recover.269 A discharge is wrongful if it was a retaliatory act against an
employee who refused to violate a public policy or who reported a violation of
public policy, 2 7 0 if the discharge was not for good cause and the employee had
already completed the probationary period of employment,271 or if "the
employer violated the express provisions of its own personnel policy." 2 72 The
WDEA requires that employers have a probationary period of employment, and
during this period, the employment may be terminated at-will by either party.273
The employer may establish his own probationary period.274 If any employer
does not set his own probationary period, the WDEA provides that the
probationary period will be six months from the date of hire. 275 The WDEA
does allow employees to be discharged for good cause, which is defined as
"reasonable job-related grounds for dismissal based on a failure to satisfactorily
perform duties, disruption of the employer's operation, or other legitimate

business reason." 2 76

267
268

See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-901 (2011).
Id. §39-2-904.

Id. §39-2-905.
Id. §39-2-904(1)(a).
271
Id. §39-2-904(1)(b).
272
Id. § 39-2-904(1)(c). Public policy is defined as "a policy in effect at the time of the
discharge concerning the public health, safety, or welfare established by a constitutional
provision, state, or administrative rule." Id. § 39-2-903(7).
273
Id. § 39-2-904(2)(a).
274
Id. § 39-2-904(2)(b).
269
270

275
276

Id
Id § 39-2-903(5).
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Under the WDEA, a wrongfully discharged employee may be awarded
lost wages and fringe benefits for up to four years from the date of discharge.277
But even under the WDEA, the employee is still required to mitigate his
damages by reasonably seeking other employment. 2 7 8 If he does not seek other
employment with reasonable diligence, the amount that he could have earned if
he had fulfilled his obligation will be deducted from the amount awarded for
lost wages.279 In addition to lost wages and fringe benefits, the wrongfully
discharged employee may recover punitive damages if he establishes by clear
and convincing evidence that the employer discharged him while engaging in
actual fraud or actual malice. 2 80 An employee cannot recover any other types of
damages except those provided for in the WDEA: 2 8 1 lost wages and fringe
benefits with interim earnings deducted and, when actual fraud or actual malice
is proved by clear and convincing evidence, punitive damages. Adopting a
similar statute in West Virginia would promote predictability and certainty for
employers while providing security for the employee. However, this statute
would also dramatically change West Virginia's employment landscape and
overrule approximately one hundred years of case law supporting at-will
employment. Therefore, simply overruling the Mason County malicious
discharge exception is not only the most efficient and expedient option but also
the one that best fits with the whole of West Virginia law.
VII. CONCLUSION

The collateral source rule has been active in the West Virginia labor
and employment community since 1982 under the title of the Mason County
rule, and the WVSCA extended this rule to front pay in Peters. Employers
increasingly must pay larger damage awards to wrongfully discharged
employees, and it is time for the West Virginia courts and legislature to
consider the effects of this rule on West Virginia's employment and business
environment. The court should overrule the Mason County rule in order to
incentivize employees to seek new employment and to prevent enormous
damage awards that hurt the West Virginia business economy. In the
alternative, the West Virginia legislature could consider the Garnes factors

277
Id. § 39-2-905(1). This includes interest on the lost wages and fringe benefits. Id. Fringe
benefits includes the "value of any employer-paid vacation leave, sick leave, medical insurance
plan, disability insurance plan, life insurance plan, and pension benefit plan in force on the date
of the termination." Id. § 39-2-903(4).
278
Id § 39-2-905(1).
279
Id However, before these interim earnings are deducted from the lost wages award, the
employee may deduct any reasonable expenses he incurred in "searching for, obtaining, or
relocating to new employment." Id
210
Id. § 39-2-905(2).
281
Id. § 39-2-905(3).
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application to the award, collateral source reform such as the tort community is
currently undergoing, a just cause statute that establishes exactly what damages
an employer must pay in a wrongful discharge statute, or at-will employment
reform that would lower damage awards and provide more certainty and
predictability for all parties involved. These solutions will allow West Virginia
to maintain an "open for business" environment and create predictability and
certainty for both employee and employer.
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